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European Studies

**Conflict Resolution. The Role of AKDN and OSCE during and after
the Pamir Crisis.**

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Abstract

Towards the end of July 2012, the government of Tajikistan sent heavy operation forces in response to stabbing of the head of National Security Committee in GBAO which resulted in two days perpetual fight between the government troops and the supporters of the main perpetrator. The aim of the thesis is to compare the role of two international organizations- a European and Central Asian one- AKDN and OSCE during the breakout of the clashes.

The first part of the empirical study examines the tendency of the Civil War in Tajikistan and attempts to draw parallel lines with the clashes that occurred in July. The core part of the theses concentrates on evaluating the position, possibilities, and approaches for conflict resolution of the two organizations during the conflict and their activities in Tajikistan since their establishment. During the conflict, AKDN played a crucial role as a mediator, in bringing the opposing parties together in creating an atmosphere for dialogue which resulted in signing the bilateral agreement. On contrary, Vienna based, OSCE with the mandate of peaceful resolution of disputes and promotion of democracy in the region had a more limited role through the conflict. Thus, the paper as well portrays the reasons for such insignificant role of the OSCE through the conflict. It has to be noted that during the military operation the access to the region has been blocked and the communication lines for more than a month were cut off. It seems that, however, International Organizations and foreign diplomats were kept out to avoid global attention and media coverage. Based on expert interviews that have been conducted for this case, the study also includes prospective plans of both institutions in preventing any further conflict eruption.

Resümee

Ende Juli 2012 hat die Regierung Tadschikistans schwere operative Kräfte als Antwort auf die Tötung des Leiters des Staatssicherheitskomitees in GBAO in einer Messerstecherei entsandt, infolgedessen ein zwei Tage andauernde Kampf zwischen den Regierungstruppen und den Unterstützern des Haupttäters entbrannte. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist, die Rolle von zwei internationalen Organisationen – einer europäischen und zentralasiatischen, einer lokalen und einer regionalen – AKDN und OSZE während des Ausbruchs der Zusammenstöße zu vergleichen.

Der erste Teil der empirischen Studie untersucht die Hintergründe des Bürgerkriegs in Tadschikistan und versucht, Parallelen mit den Zusammenstößen zu ziehen, die im Juli 2012 passiert sind. Der Hauptteil der Arbeit konzentriert sich dabei auf die Evaluation der Position, Möglichkeiten und Ansätze der Konfliktresolution der beiden Organisationen während des Konflikts und seit Beginn ihrer Tätigkeiten in Tadschikistan. Während des Konflikts fiel dem AKDN eine entscheidende Mittlerrolle, im Zusammenbringen der Gegenparteien, im Schaffen einer Atmosphäre für den Dialog, zu, der auf das Schließen des bilateralen Vertrags hinauslief. Im Gegensatz dazu kam der OSZE trotz ihres Mandates zur friedlichen Beilegung von Konflikten und der Förderung der Demokratie im Gebiet nur eine beschränkte Rolle im aktuellen Konflikt zu. So schildert die Arbeit ferner die Gründe für diese unbedeutende Rolle der OSZE im Rahmen des Konfliktes. Offensichtlich wurden internationale Organisationen und ausländische Diplomaten aus dem Gebiet und dem Gebiet herausgehalten, um eine globale Aufmerksamkeit und Medienberichterstattung zu vermeiden. Es muss festgehalten werden, dass während des Militäreinsatzes der Zugang zum Gebiet blockiert worden ist und die Nachrichtenverbindungen mehr als einen Monat unterbrochen wurden, wodurch für viele internationale Organisationen Hindernisse geschaffen wurden, um in dem Gebiet aktiv zu

sein. Gestützt auf Experteninterviews, die für diese Arbeit geführt worden sind, schließt die Studie auch die Analyse zukünftiger Pläne beider Einrichtungen im Verhindern weiterer Auseinandersetzungen ein.

Acronyms

AKDN-Aga-Khan Development Network

AKF-Aga-Khan Foundation

BBC-British Broadcasting Corporation

CGG-Commission on Global Governance

CNR-Commission on National Reconciliation

CSCE -Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

EU -European Union

GBAO -Gorniy Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast

ICR-Interactive Conflict Resolution

ICRC -International Committee of Red the Cross

IOs -International Organizations

NGOs -Nongovernmental Organizations

OSCE -Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

RT-Republic of Tajikistan

SCNST -State Committee on National Security

UN-United Nations

UK-United Kingdom

UTO -United Tajik Opposition

USA-United States of America

1.1 Introduction

By the end of July 2012, the government of Tajikistan sent special heavy operation in response to the stabbing of the Head of National Committee in the Gorniy Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), General Nazarov. For two days government troops battled with the supporters of the main perpetrator of the stabbed general in the center of the GBAO-Khorog (Sharbanau, 2012). According to British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) news around forty two people including twelve soldiers and thirty “rebels” have been killed within two days of the shooting. In contrary hospital official in the capital city of Tajikistan, Dushanbe reported more than 200 killed, while state officials only announced of 60 people injured among whom were both civilians and soldiers (BBC, July 2012). The central ground for such blurred information on the media was due to limited access to the region and lack of communication lines.

It remains questionable whether it was necessary for the government of Republic of Tajikistan to send 3000 troops and put under risk the civilians and at the same time vulnerable minority, after 15 years of signing the Peace Agreement for the government of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT). Hence it stays uncertain whether the measures that were taken by the government during the holy month of Ramadan were adequate.

The central objective of the study is to look at the conflict that arose in the Pamir in July of 2012 and to find answer to the following questions:

- What is conflict and when it becomes violent?
- What different approaches towards conflict resolution were at hand?
- Are European and Central Asian, global and local approaches different? Were all of them considered?

- Can the events that happened in July 2012 in the Pamir traced back to the Civil War in Tajikistan?
- Why an organization with a local basis was dealing with the conflict and not a regional European security organization?

Hence, the paper tries to answer questions mentioned above. Firstly, it looks at the concept of conflict from the theoretical standpoint and takes into consideration several aspects as the sources of conflicts in the region, the role of third parties in the conflict resolution process and their involvement and intends to imply theories of Conflict Studies for this particular case.

Secondly, it is important to spot the core reasons of the conflict and see whether this conflict has parallel or common historical pattern with the clashes that happened in Tajikistan after gaining independence. Therefore, it is highly vital to look at the Civil war in Tajikistan that took place during the 1992-1997, main actors and opposing groups of the conflict and find crossroads with the summer clashes in GBAO. If this is the case, the Break-out of violence could be seen as frozen conflict becoming violent.

The final and the core objective of the paper is to consider the role of Nongovernmental Institutions (NGOs) through the conflict and its resolution procedure. Therefore, the study aims at comparing the role of the Vienna Based, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Aga-Khan Development Network (AKDN) during and after the clashes based on the expert interviews, published sources like reports by International Organizations (IOs) and media coverage. In addition, to provide empirical evidence for the hypotheses six expert interviews have been conducted among the OSCE and AKDN employees. For comparison within the empirical chapter three expert interviews have been conducted among high officials of AKDN and three among OSCE officials. It is important to highlight that these two organizations have different backgrounds and mandates in the region. Nevertheless both organizations started their activities almost at the

same time after the independence of Tajikistan and eruption of Civil War and had different roles during the July clashes in Khorog.

The first chapter of the paper examines the theoretical framework and methodology that has been designed to give proof for the empirical chapter. It covers theories on the Conflict and resolution like: Need Based, Cooperation Based, Controlled Communication, Do No Harm Rule and the concept of Frozen Conflict. The paper is implemented by using qualitative research method and tends to compare two organizations and their role during the Conflict. As the two institutions acquired different roles in the conflict the comparison cannot be systematically.

In the second chapter, the paper focuses on the years of Civil War which brought tremendous loss and psychological trauma to the whole population of Tajikistan. Due to the fact that the main perpetrator for the stabbing of the general Nazarov was a member of the Opposition Party during the Civil War and previous attempt has been undertaken by the government to remove the former opposition leaders, provides an indication or a reason for the researcher to examine civil war and find parallels between what happened during 1992-1997 and the July clashes in Khorog.

The third chapter examines the role of two important institutions in Tajikistan which had significant contribution during the signing of the Peace Accord of the Civil War. Consequently, the paper compares several variables like activities, historical pattern, cooperation with the government, involvement of the organization with the civil society, and strategies and activities in conflict resolution field. Therefore, these two organizations can be compared in the context of the July events in Khorog, GBAO.

Thus, the researcher came to three preliminary hypotheses which are:

1. Memories and social traumas received by the “Pamiris” during the anarchy and disorder of the Civil War have to some extent reemerged during the July government military operation.

2. During July events in Khorog, AKDN with its strong societal base in the region took an active role of a mediator in resolving the conflict that erupted between the Governments Military force and the informal leaders while OSCE with a mandate of peace and security did not take direct part in the conflict resolution process.

3. Theories of Controlled Communication and Do no harm theory can be implemented in the context of the clashes in the Pamir for conflict resolution process.

The empirical chapter is aimed at providing empirical evidences for the hypothesis bases on media coverage and expert interviews.

1.2 Importance and limitations of the Study

The present study is a unique work being one of the very first papers which explores the role of the International Institutions in the Pamir conflict. Besides, the topic is important and distinctive for the European Studies, since it is intended to examine the role of European regional organization and a more or less Central Asian organization.

Furthermore, the topic is quite timely, not well researched and publicly discussed, and very few academic papers have been written on the topic. Exploratory researches are very essential in scientific research, since the researcher is breaking new grounds, making new findings and providing new ideas (Kent, 1993).The particular topic of the study is aimed at bringing new insights, thought and it provides grounds for flexibility, creativity and critical thinking to the researcher. In addition the paper is exclusive, since it examines the role and

behavior of the two institutions that have different mandate in the region and which are involved in diverse activities. Moreover, the topic is highly important for me as a researcher, since I am well acquainted and familiar with the region and the situation as a whole. Therefore, it was important for me to make empirical research and find answers to the questions that arouse in my mind and in the mind of many Pamiris that have experience the conflict. Finally, this research can be a small contribution to the field of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies.

As it has been mentioned above, the research topic is fairly new and not many academic publications have been published on the topic. In addition, the topic that is researched is not being examined or discussed in the region and the country as a whole which makes it even harder to find valid data. Besides, the study has been implemented using qualitative research method employed by textual analysis and expert interviews. Secondly, geographical and human resource limitation were present, since in order to take interviews, the researcher had to fly to the region and locate contacts in order to take interviews with OSCE and AKDN high officials . In addition, not all the interviews were allowed to be taped, which created some difficulties in term of comprehending and writing all the needed information at the same time.

1.3 What is conflict, when it becomes violent?

Conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others in achieving their goals (Oxford Dictionary). Thus, conflict is present in all dimensions, starting from the simplest like within a family and up to the international level. According to Landau (2001) “conflict exist in all human relationships: it always has and probably will” (Rose, Suppiah and Othman, 2006). Besides, conflict exists, whenever incompatible activities occur and

when one party is interfering, disrupting, or in some other way making other party's action less effective who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving these goals (ibid). As conflict is part of human co-existence, conflict resolution becomes essential.

As Jim Wallis has noted in his book *The Soul of Politics*-war is the decision to go for victory rather than resolution. Peacemaking is an attempt to resolve the sources of the conflict and restore a situation of balance, thereby eliminating the need for victory and defeat (Wallis, 1994). The world today continues to be besieged by a host of destructive and constant intractable conflicts between groups, factions, and nations that induce incredible costs in human and material terms and that sap the resources so badly needed for human development. Fisher in his book *Interactive Conflict Resolution* looks at the economic and human development from a very interesting angle and notes:

While humankind's technological capacity develops at incredible pace, our relatively underdeveloped social and political competence sadly determines that we use our increasing physical ability to attain new levels of horror and destructions (Fisher, 1997).

Over the last 150 years the world have seen two devastating wars followed by 150 smaller wars that have been fought on the territory of more than seventy-five countries which led to millions and millions of human death (Alker and Sherman, 1982). The total amount of costs, both economic and social that is being spent on the wars is enormous. It has been estimated that World military expenditures makes around one trillion dollar every year and what is more interesting is that many countries spend more on employment of arms than providing good health for its civilians (Sivar, 1993). What needs to be done in order to move the world into peace, justice and decent living standard-a question that has not one answer. In 1992 a Commission on Global Governance was established with the purpose of creating

favorable conditions for strengthening global co-operation to create a more peaceful, just habitable world for all people in the world (CGG).

Following the World War II a whole discipline which is called “Need Based”, “Cooperation Based” or “Interest Based” conflict resolution has developed. It has then been diverged from power-based conflict theory (realism), which dominated and still dominates political science, and international relations; and converged from psychology and sociology, which was interested in group dynamics, motivation and relationships between institutional structures. Normative political theory sees conflict as a competitive struggle to be won by one side. In contrast, Needs-Based conflict resolution theorists developed a cooperative approach to conflict resolution, focusing on fundamental human needs, to encourage ‘win-win’ solutions. Nonviolence, cooperation and the belief in the essential goodness of humanity are basic principles of this approach to conflict resolution (Steward, 2006).

Different approaches in conflict resolution have been developed and recommended by various intellectuals and one of these approaches is Interactive Conflict Resolution. Fisher highlights that "Interactive conflict resolution (ICR) involves problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of groups or states engaged in violent protracted conflict." (Fisher: 239) it is primarily a social-psychological approach to conflict resolution. ICR emphasizes the need for direct communication between opposing parties, and for a skilled intermediary to facilitate that communication.

The ultimate goals are deep understanding, mutual recognition and respect, and jointly acceptable and sustainable solutions--in sum, an improved relationship between the parties (Fisher: 241).

Already in the mid-1960s John Burton used the ICR workshops to address escalating conflicts between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. These workshops paved the way for the 1966 Manila Peace Agreement. Apart from Burton, other scientist like Herbert Kelman,

Edward Azar also conducted workshops addressing conflict in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israeli-Palestinian, Argentina and the U.K. over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the Lebanese civil war, and the conflict in Sri Lanka (Fisher, 1997).

Theoretical foundations of ICR include Burton's model of "Controlled Communication, which emphasizes the role of a third-party in creating a non-threatening, analytical atmosphere in which the parties can realize and correct misperceptions of the other. Burton locates the roots of protracted conflicts in groups' pursuits of their basic human needs. He argues, that the problem solving approaches to decision making may allow us to "prevent" conflict by promoting collaboration and awareness of basic human needs.

Leonard Doob has explored methods for evaluating ICR interventions, and examined the planning, timing, choice and implementation of effective interventions. Kelman distinguishes problem-solving processes from human relations training, and stresses the social-psychological nature of the process. Fisher has explored the role, tactics, and qualities of effective third-party consultants in ICR. In related fields, Azar has proposed a model of prenegotiation, Saunders has developed a relational model of problem solving, and John MacDonald and Louise Diamond have developed a typology of multi-track diplomacy (Fisher, 1997).

One of the most important frameworks for conflict-sensitive project management is the one that has been devised by Mary Anderson who is generally known as "Do no Harm" rule. According to this principle, unintended consequences of humanitarian aid and project work must be critically examined to identify, avoid and ease unwanted conflict-exacerbating impact. In order to properly assess the content and operational aspects of project work, it has to examine and assess the prior content and operational aspect of the work. As Mary Anderson proposes, it is essential to examine the project settings, interaction between the project and

project setting, its impacts and adjustments and readjustments that are needed if something happens. Moreover, a partner organization is also essential and through this higher results are most probable to be achieved.

The process of the conflict management and prevention approaches that have been developed and proposed by different researchers becomes even more difficult to apply in the regions beset by “Frozen Conflict”. Nodia defines Frozen Conflicts those that are violent ethno-political conflict over secession which has led to the establishment of a *de facto* regime that is recognized by neither the international community nor the rump state from which the secession occurred (Alice and Nagle, 2009). In principal any number of endogenous factors can effect on the character of the frozen conflict. For instance, a rump states inability or lack of political will in order to alter the status quo. The inability of a rump state and/or reluctance is often directly related to the potential backlash from external actors that any change to the status quo is accountable to provoke (ibid).

From above mentioned, it can be said that there are various theories and models of conflict resolution that have been indorsed by various scholars. Each approach has its own specification, level (regional, national, international) at which the conflict is being dealt with, type of the conflict and consequently referring to these characteristics, a particular model is being designed to employ for explicit conflicting state of affairs. Theoretical Concepts as Controlled Communication, Frozen Conflict, and Do No Harm Rule can be implemented in the context of the clashes in the Pamir for conflict resolution procedure.

1.4 Methodology

The paper has been implemented by using qualitative research method and this chapter presents the research methodology employed by the thesis. These include the collecting of documents, textual analysis, and expert interviews. The qualitative research

design is the optimal choice for this specific research project due to several aims. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994), qualitative research focuses on interpretation of phenomena in their natural settings to make sense in terms of the meanings people bring to these settings. Moreover, qualitative research involves collecting information about personal experiences, introspection, life story, interviews, observations, historical, interactions and visual text and analyzes them. The aim of qualitative research is to truthfully present findings to others who are interested in what you are doing. (Patton, 1996)

In addition, qualitative method provides more flexibility by allowing greater spontaneity and interaction between the researcher and the study participants or the interviewers. Generally, there are three most common qualitative methods which include participant observation, in-depth interviews, and focus groups (Sanchez, 2010). Each method can be suited in order to gain specific type of data. For this case, in-depth interviews were used in turn to better understand the issue and get answer to the research question.

For this particular case study, the comparative approach has been applied, since it can assist the researcher to identify and analyze the similarities and differences of the problem more clearly. Moreover, comparative approach has a long tradition dating back to Ancient Greece. Since the nineteenth century, philosophers, anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists have used comparisons to achieve various objectives. The goal of comparative analysis is to explain the “puzzle” which cannot be studied without comparing and which are derived from logical reasoning (Hantrais, 1996). This paper is comparing two organizations, AKDN and OSCE during the conflicting situation in Khorog, summer 2012. As the two institutions had different roles in the conflict the comparison cannot be systematic.

The research has been designed in three stages. The aim of the first stage is to look at the historical documents and primary sources. Secondary sources include different theories on conflict resolution and approaches that are being offered in order to cope with the

conflict. After looking at the primary data, it was particularly essential to define set of theories that could be suitable for the case. Consequently three main theories like “Human Need Model and Model of Controlled Communication”-by John Burtin, “Do No Harm Theory” by Mary Anderson for conflict assessment and “Frozen Conflict” theories (Fisher, 1997) are used to explore the Civil War and the July Crisis in the region.

Secondly, the research explores the published sources like reports by the International Organizations (IOs), media coverage, published interviews and examines the collected data. Moreover, it looks at the articles that have been published on the Civil War in Tajikistan and July events and examines correlations between the two events.

Thirdly, the core part of the study is the empirical part consisting of expert interviews. According to Qualitative Research Methods Overview guide, interviews are helpful for obtaining information on individuals’ personal histories, perspectives, and experiences. This method is especially helpful when the topics that are being examined are sensitive as conflict situation are and the interviewer intends to find out more detailed information on the topic researched. The study is employing semi structured interviews consisting of a list of open ended questions. These semi structured interviews has been conducted among the AKDN and OSCE members, both international, European and local experts. For such interview it is important to ask one main question and then while talking ask some more to get a better image of the situation and the case and subsequently answer the research question which is the main goal of the researcher. While asking questions, it was important to take into consideration not only the meaning but also, facial expression, tone, wording, pausing and the mood of the respondents. To not tell on behalf of oneself but on behalf of an organization, this puts double pressure on the respondents shoulder. Secondly, it is difficult for any person to talk about conflict especially when there are civilian victims. Therefore observation is an

important technique while taking in-depth interviews. The technique of coding has been employed for the study. The interviews have been coded and supported by theory.

Chapter 2

2.1 Brief overview of the region

Situated high in the Pamir Mountains, the region covers about half of Tajikistan territory. Its population comprise of 250,000 people which account for less than 4 percent of the country's 7.5 million population. More than 30,000 people live in Khorog alone (Ferorenko). Pamir is home to several ethnic groups among which are Shughni, Rushani, Bartangi, Roshorvi, Khufi, Ishkashimi and Wakhi. The Pamiri ethnic communities differ from majority Tajiks in terms of religion, language and ethnicity. The vast majority of Pamiri communities are of Nizari Ismaili Shia confession whereas majorities Tajiks are Sunni Muslim (Dodykhudoeva, 2012). GBAO was given the status of an "autonomous" province during the Soviet period because its residents constituted a distinct ethnic minority. Moreover, the province consists of a number of interconnected high-altitude valleys in which people have retained their unique identities, traditions, and vernaculars that are quite different from Tajik language that is spoken in other parts of the region and traditions that are practiced. Although the Soviet rulers did much to iron out the differences between the Pamiris and the rest of the Tajik people, the civil war fought in 1992-97, shortly after Tajikistan's independence reinforced the divisions once more (Sodikov, 2012).

2.2 Civil War in Tajikistan

During the Civil War the elites of Pamiri communities united with Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan and were one of the belligerent groups. Due to this, in the chaos of ongoing war, people of Pamir "Pamiris", who lived in different cities around the

country, were separated and even treated as enemies by other ethnic groups in Tajikistan. Pamirians were often discriminated, mistreated and killed. Consequently, majority left everything behind and fled to Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region where they felt safer and more protected and others left the country. Social traumas received by the people of Pamir during anarchy and disorder of Civil War unfortunately will have an effect for many decades to come, if not generations. The memories of the Civil War reemerged during the July 2012 events in the Pamir. This could be observed from the press and media where words like badakhshani, kulyabi, kurgantube, and people from the north which reemerged the division. After this disintegration and fragmentation of the national identity this separation became even more noticeable. Not only appear regional division, but also division between the cities (Respondant 1 from AKDN). This shows that the conflict that was lasting for more than five years was not solved, but for some period frozen, since from the definition of frozen conflicts we see that the Civil War was violent ethno political conflict over secession and the conflict has not been settled till the end but was stopped with the assistance of the international organizations and internal and external actors.

As it has been mentioned above, at the beginning of the civil war, the Pamiris were in alliance with the Islamic and Democratic forces, collectively known as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which fought against the ex-communist apparatchiks supported by powerful militias from the Kulyab region. As the latter gained control of the country's southern regions and the capital, Pamiri militias retreated to GBAO where high mountains and narrow valleys provided them with a secure defensive barrier. From early 1993 onwards, the commanders of these militias became the dominant political force in the region. They enjoyed broad popular support and came to be regarded as "heroes" because they defended the region from outsiders and used the profits made from the smuggling of gemstones and drugs to supply the local people with imported foodstuffs, thus saving them from starvation.

Ayombekov became a de facto leader of these militias after his prominent brother, Abdulamon (aka “Hunchback Alyosh”) who was assassinated in 1994. The other three strongmen – Mamadbokirov, Imomnazarov, Shomusallamov targeted by the government also achieved prominence during the civil war. As part of the peace process negotiated in 1997, many former opposition militants were incorporated into the state security services. Ayombekov was appointed commander of police battalion in Khorog and later, in 2008, deputy head of the Ishkashim border post. Although these assignments provided Ayombekov with little formal power, he continued to serve as the region’s informal leader, while Imomnazarov, Mamadboqirov, and Shomusallamov also retained influence. These leaders often served as informal arbiters and “defenders” of the local residents in disputes with the regional administrators, judges, prosecutors, and police officials. Many Pamiris acquiesced with the special extra-legal role played by Ayombekov and other strongmen because they were seen as “local” and “more just” in contrast with the “outsider” and “corrupt” officials.(Sodiqov, 2012) Therefore, large-scale military operation organized in order to apprehend just a few individuals accused of homicide of General Nazarov might lead to misunderstanding and wrong interpretations by the people in the region. Post-civil war traumas make people remember the horror of the past. For quite a long period after the civil war an enormous attempt has been done by the president of RT in order to erase these memories through the “National Identity Project” but these July events show opposite. Looking back at the brutality of the Civil War in Tajikistan, it is clear that Human rights violations were perpetrated by all sides of the conflict. Luckily, on June 27, 1997 the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed. The Agreement between Tajik President Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik rebels contained list of documents, including the establishment of a Commission of National Reconciliation (CNR). Its mandate was outlined in the Protocol on the Main Functions and

Powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation, which was signed on December 23, 1996. The main intention of the CNR was:

Attainment of national reconciliation through the creation of an atmosphere of trust and mutual forgiveness, and the institution of a broad dialogue among the various political forces in the country (Brahm, Dancy and Kim).

Passed into law in 1997, CNR was officially sanctioned by the government, and it had a large quantity of mandated powers, including monitoring the peace agreement, implementing measures related to the return of refugees, amending legislation regulating political parties, formulating possible changes to the constitution, reforming non-inclusive government institutions and the electoral systems, managing the disarmament of militant groups and the repatriation of prisoners of war, and overseeing the adoption of a Reciprocal Pardon Act (ibid). Therefore, in the case of Tajikistan, CNR lacked focus on investigation of human right abuses and did not perform its fundamental substantive task that characterizes truth commission work. Thus it should not be called included into the truth commission and can be called even a failure. In the Case of the Tajikistan, it was more an institution of transitional governance, comprised as it was of members from the former government and the opposition.

Peacemaking according to Wallis is about resolving the sources of conflict and restoring the situation of balance, by eliminating any need for victory or defeat, and not digging back the old wounds (Mills, 2006). This tendency can be noted in the context of July clashes, since one of the motives of such big scale operation was removing the old opposition leaders. The government of Tajikistan sent troops into Khorog, the regional capital of the semi-autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBO), in the eastern part of the country. The incursion was ordered in order to punish the killers of Major-General Abdullo Nazarov, the head of the regional branch of the State Committee on National

Security (SCNST) who was stabbed to death on July 22 during his visit to Ishkoshim region. According to an official statement of the SCNST and the Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General was killed by a local criminal group. The response to the stabbing of general by the Government was a large scale special operation in Khorog by the security and military forces involving armed vehicles and helicopters (Majidov, 2012)

The act started early morning of July 24, when Tajikistan's security and military forces started a special operation in the densely populated areas of Khorog without prior notice or evacuation of the local population. The operation was followed by a joint statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee on National Security saying that the operation aimed to seize and apprehend military groups responsible for the murder of the SCNST Major General. The Government law enforcement authority reported that, according to the preliminary results of the investigation, General Nazarov was killed by a criminal group in Khorog headed by Tolib Ayembekov who was at that time the deputy head of the Ishkashim frontier post at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. Law enforcement authorities in their statement proposed to Ayembekov that all those suspected of participation in the murder of General Nazarov should yield voluntary. However, Ayembekov rejected the offer, claiming that the local population of GBAO does not trust governmental law enforcement bodies and the judicial system, which had discredited itself "by a number of prejudiced acts and decisions. Furthermore, Ayembekov stated that the Major General himself started a conflict with a few local youngsters and that the conflict resulted in "homicide by accident"(ibid).

Nevertheless, the Government started an operation allegedly involving over 3,000 armed personnel, armed vehicles and helicopters in the densely populated areas of Khorog town. Furthermore, all means of communication in the Badakhshan region, including

telephone, mobile and internet were blocked by the Government. The only road connecting Khorog with other parts of the country was also blocked. Approximately 30,000 residents of Khorog, including women, children and elderly, were trapped in the conflict (Sabzalieva, 2012).

For two days the government troops battled with the supporters of Tolib Ayombekov, who has been accused for being the main perpetrator in Nazarov's death. He is also being sought for criminal activities including charges of drug trafficking across the porous Tajik-Afghan border in this part of the country. That the story is much more complicated than the version offered by the government, since no preliminary investigation has been done. There were also such other versions like this murder was an accident, nevertheless the government declared a ceasefire held the city of Khorog effectively hostage until these demands were met. In this situation it is the government's actions that have led to the escalation of the crisis in Khorog. The reaction of the people can be explained by John Burton Basic Need theory. Except other basic needs there are needs for identity and security. Individuals cannot be socialized into behaviors that destroy their identity and other need goals and, therefore, must react against environments that do this. Moreover, denying group basic needs causes a "fear of group extinction" and this fear reflecting some kind of "biological element" make ethnic and cultural conflicts a constant and unavoidable component of socio-political systems. "No matter what barriers they may encounter, people will aspire to meet their needs, one way or another, even to the extent that they may be defined by others as "deviant" even as "criminal" (Tishkov). During the conflict, most of the population supported the informal leaders which could be explained as fear of ethnic extinction or reflex of self protection, protection of identity.

As Zohra Ismail Beben in her article “Framing the Conflict in Khorog” states, the government has opened a Pandora’s Box and the government in Dushanbe did not realize that the exit strategy may be much more difficult than the entry. What is happening in Khorog exposes much deeper contradictions of governance and the sense of uncertainty that pervades public life in Tajikistan today. To this concern one of the leaders of the Pamiri community, Mahmadshe Ilolov, who has been participating in on-going negotiations with the government on behalf of the citizens of Khorog, expressed his frustration (Ismail-Beben, 2012) since for more than a month the people were left without any communication. The result of the lack of communication and access to the GBAO, the available information about the situation in Khorog has been diverse and often contradictory. Information released by the Government stated that 12 governmental security and military personnel, and 30 militants have been killed, and that no casualties were sustained among the civilian population. However, reports by independent media differed and suggested significantly higher figures. A BBC report has suggested of over 200 casualties – 100 military personnel and about 100 civilians. The Economist reported “dozens of civilian casualties,” while Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty reported of 30 civilian deaths which escalates the situation and made it even tenser (ibid).

Furthermore, the lack of communication resulted in different rumors regarding the situation in GBAO including that government forces were bombing Khorog or that rebel groups on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan were ready to enter the country and attack governmental forces. The situation was also a source of great anxiety to many people with relatives, friends or colleagues residing in this part of Tajikistan. A number of demonstrations in front of Tajikistan’s Embassies (in Bishkek, Moscow, and Washington D.C.) were organized by Tajik people living abroad, demanding the Government to halt the military operation and to ensure communication and physical access to the region (Ismail-Beben, 2012).

Tajikistan's opposition parties (the Social Democratic Party, the Party of Islamic Revival and the Communist Party) made a joint statement condemning the military operation and asked for "peaceful solutions." Later on a group of Tajik activists appealed to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, the U.S. Embassy, the EU Delegation to Tajikistan, the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia, the UN representation in Tajikistan appealed to the government with demanding that freedom of speech is ensured and communication with GBAO fully restored as soon as possible. Furthermore, international appeals have been made to the government to ensure access of humanitarian workers to Khorog in order to assess the impact of the military operation on the local population. The actions by the Tajik authorities represent violations of the commitments and obligations of the Republic of Tajikistan under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other UN human rights instruments, the OSCE Human Dimension Commitments and the Fourth Geneva Convention. The European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and American Embassy in Tajikistan have expressed their concern over the violent clashes and called for lines of communication to be opened (Sabzalieva, Emma. 2012).

Chapter 3

3.1 OSCE and AKDN in Tajikistan

The clashes that erupted in July 2012, in Khorog were not left without the notice of the international and/or regional organizations like United Nation, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Union, Red Cross and Aga-Khan Development Network, yet the scale of contribution and effect on the conflict was surprisingly unlike. Coming back to the second hypothesis which states:

AKDN with its strong societal base in the region took an active role of a mediator in resolving the conflict that erupted between the Government's Military force and the informal leaders while OSCE with a mandate of peace and security did not take direct part in the conflict resolution process

It is vital to overview the core reason for such kind of the behavior in the case of July Clashes in Khorog. Therefore, one of the core purposes of the paper is to peruse core motives of the two organizations.

One of the biggest challenges for the international organizations when tackling territorial conflicts is the complexity of developing a meaningful strategy of engagement that under international law would encompass both the principle of territorial integrity and of the right for self-determination of people. According to Roxana Cristescu work "Engaging with civil society in conflict areas— the role of international organizations" government and state actors have political and legal limitations that restrain them from effectively addressing such conflicts and engaging with all conflict stakeholders. By consequence, the most likely actors to engage with all conflict affected groups are international private diplomacy actors and local civil society organizations. In principal, NGOs can do things that that governments cannot, such as "facilitating the development of new and creative ideas, provide a trusted by informal channel of communication, and expand linkages of contacts, particularly to groups or individuals that governments may be precluded from meeting with because of political or legal concerns" which is the advantage of NGOs and IOs during conflicts (Cristescu, 2010)

Referring to July Clashes, it is necessary to look at these two organizations separately and look at several factors like-launch of activities, primary objectives, degree of trust between the people and organization and at the same time the degree of trust between government and organization, conflict resolution involvement, types of activities involved

and future plans. Nevertheless, the comparison cannot be accomplished in systematic way since the two institutions had different role during the conflict and after settling.

3.2 OSCE

When it comes to the primary role of providing framework for preventive diplomacy, facilitating negotiations, and furthering processes of conflict resolution, primary responsibility falls to the shoulders of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The organization has been initiated in 1973 as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), this organization has evolved into a comprehensive, European-wide and later on as a global player among security organizations. Numerous OSCE missions such as those in Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, and Central Asia have had among the central elements of their mandates a charge to assist the governments of transitional states in the process of complying with democratic norms. In Central Asia, specifically Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, the OSCE has assisted the governments in the promotion of democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes in a region where democratic traditions and practices are historically nonexistent. Although most of these activities have little direct influence on the occurrence or avoidance of violent conflict, they are assumed to create the necessary long-term conditions for eliminating violence as a means for resolving conflicts of interest and substituting in place of coercion, compromise, and bargaining as a way of overcoming differences (Hopmann and Thomas).

The OSCE presence in Tajikistan is the Organization's longest-running operation in Central Asia, having been established in early 1994 by a CSCE Council decision adopted in Rome in 1993. The mission has been established to bring peace and end the war in Tajikistan which is seen as one of the most tragic conflicts in Central Asia. Tajik authorities and the United Tajik Opposition signed the "General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Reconciliation" to end the war that lasted from 1992 to 1997. According to the

OSCE report it has been estimated that around 100 000 people died during that period. During the transition period (June 1997–February 2000), the local NGOs played a major role in the pre-election process. In collaboration with the OSCE mission in Dushanbe, local NGOs trained by OSCE experts and staff organized hundreds of training seminars focusing on civic, gender, and human-rights topics (Slim, 2002). This intense work done by the OSCE after the civil war can be clarified using the “Do no Harm rule”. Referring to this concept, it can be noted that the institution has fulfilled criteria of the concept, since it made examination of the conflict, assessed the areas where more assistance were needed and collaborated with other local NGOs in its projects execution. Moreover, the case of Civil War in Tajikistan cannot be described by the normative political theory of competitive struggle, since there was officially no winner or loser. The conflict has been solved using win-win solution assisted by the international actors by developing cooperative approach to conflict resolution, focusing on cooperation and belief in the so called “goodness of humanity”. (Mills, 2006)

According to one of my respondent from the OSCE - organization strongly collaborates with the government institutions and the military structures to maintain its presence in Tajikistan. Consequently, it can be stated that the organization has put too much emphasis on keeping its relationship with the government, and have to some extent overlooked its primary goal-serving and providing security to the people.

Furthermore, in 2002, in recognition of Tajikistan’s achievements since the end of the civil war, the participating States revised the mandate of the OSCE’s field operation in Tajikistan and established a Centre in Dushanbe, similar to those operating in Almaty, Ashgabat, Bishkek and Tashkent. The country — together with its neighbors has continued its rightful role in promoting and strengthening regional security and stability through the Organization’s comprehensive and co-operative approach. No longer was

Tajikistan considered as a “post-conflict” country, Tajikistan fully participates in the OSCE as an equal partner. Just like its neighbors in Central Asia, Tajikistan continues to engage in a strong dialogue with the OSCE. It does so through the task force and by hosting numerous high-level visits, such as visit by the Chairman-in-Office, the Secretary General, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly and many other high representatives(2007, OSCE Magazine).

Throughout its mandate, OSCE has built strong partnership and cooperation with the government of Tajikistan in wide range of areas ranging from environment till human rights. The OSCE Office in Tajikistan has supported the Government of Tajikistan in updating the state legislative and policy framework since 2005, by suggesting amendments to the Nature Protection Law and proposing tangible recommendations on the improvement of the waste management system based on thorough assessments and analysis. At the request of the government, the OSCE Office in Tajikistan also supported a major Climate Change Survey which recommends environmental and socio-economic policy options to the Government of Tajikistan by providing a comprehensive analysis of national policy, legal and institutional systems (OSCE, Feb 2013) In addition, the Office provides capacity- and institution-building for human rights institutions and actors, as well as awareness-raising and networking activities for and among professional groups, civil society and the public . It contributes to enhancing trust and co-operation between and among governmental entities, civil society and the general public through dialogue on the promotion, protection and implementation of human rights. In order to realize some of these activities the OSCE office supports the Social Partnership Club this brings together the government representatives, OSCE members and civil society to discuss relevant topics to the mandate of the OSCE. The SPC has regional outreach with meetings in Tursunzade, Kurgan-Tyube, Garm, Kulyab, Khorog and Khujand (Political dialogue, OSCE). However, whether these discussions and activities are effective, is in fact disputable. To demonstrate, .Payam Foroughi in his article “Politics and Human

Rights in Tajikistan: Squandered Opportunities, Uncertain Future” describes Tajikistan as “A black hole in Eurasia” because of the lack of attention and deficiency in global awareness of the country. Furthermore, despite its superior objectives in three dimensions, the OSCE Office in Tajikistan has had the de facto (in practice, but not officially established.) objective of maintaining a presence in the country. OSCE like other European and American organizations working in this area is giving priorities to such subjects like fighting against terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking coming from Afghanistan, thus keeping Tajikistan as a buffer zone for the West’s hard-security concerns. In principal the OSCE office is not using to full extend its political leverage to effect real reform of the country’s weakening and lawless security sectors like National Security Committee (NSC) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) (Foroughhi, 2009).

According to a research published by EUROCAM Security and Development project, since 2003 Tajikistan received around 33.5 million euro from BOMCA and 2.74 million euro from UNDP aiming at improving border management and reducing drug trafficking. However, in fact drug seizure in Tajikistan has even decreased in compared with the 2000s. In addition, no major drug lords or networks has been captured in the recent years –which show that no serious work is being done to bring down the mafias or criminal networks to justice. Several researches and critical observers have noted that drug trading networks have infiltrated Tajik government circles, which ensure the protection of drug flows across the border which shows a bilateral cooperation between the government and drug networks. Moreover, by strengthening security, donors also risk increasing government capacity to stay in power by employing repression and no vivid reforms. (Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2012) Tobacco and drug trade is one of the main reason for the conflict that arose between General Nazarov and Ayombekovs (former commander) as a result Nazarov was stabbed to death and Government military operation launched in Khorog (ibid).

Despite inconsistent transition, Tajikistan has managed to arrive at a state of relative peace and – tenuous – stability. The presence of the OSCE as an external actor can be both helpful and harmful (Payam). If the OSCE wrongly decides that its top priority is hard security while closing its eyes to flagrant violations of human rights, including extrajudicial executions committed by government organs that happen to be the beneficiaries of costly OSCE projects, and if the OSCE does not utilize its political leverage to lobby for reform in favor of the upholding of human rights, political pluralism, and fulfillment of the many international commitments that Tajikistan has entered into. To demonstrate, during my interview with human right expert, it has been emphasized that from International Human Right Standard, during this military operation many human rights were violated.

In any kind of military operations there is infringement of human rights. If we take cutting mass media –it is infringement of human right because people were unable to talk to their relatives and families. Secondly, sending 3000 troops to densely populated area is already infringement of human right. Peaceful population was not able to leave the area. As a whole I cannot fully criticize this action-maybe there were some reasons behind this military intervention. The State is a State and each State has set of Laws. If the laws are violated the state must have investigation, reveal criminals, send to court an adjudication. Such actions were not taken in the case of Khorog events.

Therefore, it is vivid that many human rights were violated and OSCE under its human right dimension could, have taken possible action. Nevertheless the head of OSCE Office in Tajikistan Ivar Vikky in his interview has explained that the OSCE staffs were 24 hours in touch with the colleagues in Khorog, the host government, international organizations and civil society kept the OSCE chairmanship and all its institutions informed of what was going in the region. The reason why it did not take active involvement as explained by the OSCE head was lack of access. In his official interview Mr. Ambassador quotes:

Until mid-October last year, international organizations, including the OSCE, were not granted access to GBAO by authorities. As soon as the restrictions were lifted, our Office sent a team to GBAO for a

preparatory visit to follow up on the implementation of OSCE programmatic activities in the region and to discuss future projects. I myself visited Khorog in November to meet with the Regional Administration, the mayor's office, the GBAO Department of Internal Affairs, community leaders and representatives from non-governmental organizations, and to discuss practical mechanisms for OSCE engagement in the region.

Comparable responds have been received during the expert interview conducted for this study by another OSCE official. The respondent explained such position of OSCE during the conflict due to uncertain material and limited access to the area of the conflict. However, the OSCE was part of the "Working Group" that was working on negotiating with the government. It bargained with the government for opening communication which was consequently opened a month later. In addition, head of OSCE office sent a statement to Permanent Council in Vienna to encourage the Tajik authorities to allow access to GBAO for international organizations and diplomatic missions. Given its mandate for early warning and conflict prevention, the OSCE could play an important role in assisting the Tajik authorities (OSCE, 2012).

Moreover, spot reports have been conveyed in the office in Vienna which gave narrative of the condition in the area under conflict. According to the report prepared on the 13th of August, about 500 weapons have been voluntarily handed over since the late July. On the 13th of September the OSCE office along with the Tajik Interior Ministry's Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Destruction Facility have organized two day operation. During these two days, the Ministry specialists using shredding machines provided by OSCE destroyed a total of 609 weapons collected in Tajikistan since the beginning of 2012. Most of them were collected over the past few weeks through the voluntary hand-in process after the recent security operation conducted in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of the

country. Alastair Livingston, the Head of the Politico-Military Department of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan during his visit to the destruction site quoted:

The destruction of the small arms to reduce the risks of arms proliferation and is an important contribution to overall security in Tajikistan.

The OSCE Office in Tajikistan provided equipment for this sort of operations under its Small Arms and Light Weapons and Conventional Ammunition (SALW&CA) program. As part of its capacity-building efforts, the OSCE also provided several refresher training courses for Tajik specialists on SALW&CA stockpiles physical security measures, including transportation and destruction of arms and ammunition (OSCE).

Moreover, OSCE is assisting the government of Tajikistan infostering a comprehensive police reforms. As one of my respondent from the OSCE office stated in his interview:

The OSCE is currently fostering police reform, which completed some major milestone over the past four years. However, a large scale incident, like the clashes in GBAO could be a major step backwards in the built between communities and the security services. The reform process are still not implemented in Tajikistan widely. It is promoted with the slogan “The Police are the People and the People are the Police”.

This simple phrase has deep meaning and intention behind it because it describes the principle of the congruence in democratic policing amongst the civil society and the police. It outlines the relationship between the police officers in the community they serve and capability to protect the values of community in those areas. In future, these interrelations can serve as a platform of public trust and confidence, without which the police cannot function effectively. It has to be noted that during the clashes in the Pamir, there was no bridge between the communities and the security services- police of the Ministry of Internal

Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan. Therefore, the following initiatives for police reforms in the GBAO are suggested to mitigate the risk of falling back into a situation “post war”, with a total lack of trust between the society and the Government security services. Such military clashes, particularly happen in the areas where the conflict was in the past and which has not been settled or so called “Frozen Conflict”. As the Interactive Conflict Resolution approach suggests, direct communication between opposing parties are needed in order to facilitate communication. The ultimate goal is mutual understanding, respect which is highly essential between the police-government and civil society and improved relations. (Fisher: 241) Similar military operation has been conducted by the government of Tajikistan in the Gharm region and the approach of building trust between people and police was implemented (Respondent from the OSCE office).

Now coming back to the second hypotheses:

During July events in Khorog, AKDN with its strong societal base in the region took an active role of a mediator in resolving the conflict that erupted between the Governments Military force and the informal leaders while OSCE with a mandate of peace and security did not take direct part in the conflict resolution process.

One has to note that there were grounds for OSCE not taking active part in the conflict resolution process. The core reasons as it has been stated by the OSCE high official are lack of access, no regional office and few projects directly dealing in the region. The OSCE mission in Tajikistan as it has been mentioned above, is the biggest in Central Asia (CA) and has main office in Dushanbe and five field offices in Garm, Khujand, Kulyab, Kurgan-Tyube and Shaartuz (OSCE) and no any in Khorog which is quite surprising. Nevertheless, OSCE with its strong political leverage to lobby could have done more, to exercise its approach of cooperative approach in conflict resolution and possibly the process went faster. Even

though, OSCE did not take active part during the conflict, after breaching the access to the region, OSCE did sent special group to GBAO for assessing and implementing the OSCE activities in the region.

Currently, the core activities of the institution in the region include: the OSCE support on Free Economic Zone in Ishkashim and the Aarhus Centre in Khorog, contribute to cross-border economic and environmental co-operation, assists to the work of a civil society advisory group within the Police Reform process, annual Social Partnership Club meetings under the Public Council, contributions to the destruction of small arms and light weapons (Asia Plus, Feb 2013), and the organization is planning to expand its activities. The special team that was organizes for the assessing of the GBAO situation met with the civil society, government officials and community leaders which show the concern of the organization in the region (ibid).

Any conflict has negative impact on the population; nevertheless positive aspects can be derived. After the clashes in the Pamir, the organization derived into conclusion of creating youth initiatives. As one of my respondent in the interviews said:

The youth often experience the loss of life and relatives and from observing the military operation-creates trauma which is problematic to erase.

Secondly, the conflict reemerged the social trauma for the generation that experienced the civil war. This draws back community to bear in mind the past and it creates prospect of further outbreak of Civil war. In the case of the young generation OSCE is planning to provide specific support to youth of the affected areas. During the expert interview conducted for the study, one of my respondent shared with the future institutions plans :

- Community police officers together with civilian staff (e.g. teachers) could organize discussion groups in schools in order to foster dialogue and discussion on the incidents
- Community policing partnership teams arrange specific designed “youth camps” with the notion of conflict resolution tailored for youth in order to understand the incidents.
- Parent – Youth initiative to discuss with community police officers together with their parents the incidents (Resonant form the OSCE).

It is crucial for Government officials, police to establish mutual understandings and cooperation with the public, since only through cooperation the government is able to regain the trust of the civil society and OSCE has been working on the Police reforms, its youth initiatives to open communication and exchange with the communities.

Nevertheless, the institution could have done more in terms of dialogue managing, providing human security and protection of human rights, and practice its cooperative conflict resolution approach. However, it has to be taken into consideration the grounds for such inactive presence of the Organization in the Pamir region during the breakout of the conflict.

3.3 AKDN

The study as well examines the role of one more civil society organization- Aga-Khan Development Network which was directly involved in the July clashes in Khorog. Therefore, th study is directed to explores organization’s presence in Tajikistan, activities that the institution is involved in , attitude of the civil society and the government toward the organization, trust and cooperation among the civil society- organization and the government officials. These variable are considered necessary in provisions of comparison with the OSCE.

After the collapse of USSR, many Central Asian countries were left in the middle of nowhere, problems occurred and many of the Soviet countries were not prepared for independent existence as a state. A vivid example is the case with Tajikistan. Owing to tensions between the opposing groups due to political competition and power the conflict escalated. The outcome was tragic losses due to splashing of the civil war that took the life of more than 100 000 people. (Shirin and Chatherine, 2001) Fortunately after years of instability in June 1997 the Tajik government and the opposition signed the General Agreement on Peace and National Accord. This agreement was achieved with the assistance of international and nongovernmental organization. Therefore, it is highly necessary to emphasize that international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) played significant role in the promotion and implementation of the peace agreement. The main INGOs were: Aga-Khan Foundation, United State Institute of Peace, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and number of local Nongovernmental Organizations (Slim, Randa). Throughout the official negotiations, UN special envoys consulted frequently with His Highness Prince Aga Khan IV on issues related to the peace process. Prince Aga-Khan IV (spiritual leader of Shia-Nizari Ismaili) himself visited Tajikistan many times and his visit in particular in May 1995 had a moderating influence on some of the negotiating parties. However the AKF has been active in Tajikistan since 1992, when with the support of international donor community, it send food aid due to imminent food shortage in GBAO which was caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its centrally planned economy, and the starting of Civil War. During the early stages of the war, the organization main activities included providing humanitarian assistance to the “Ismaili” population in the Pamir region and program on rural development. To demonstrate, since early 1993, Aga-Khan Foundation (AKF) has delivered more than 185,000 tons of goods – of which 135,000 tons of food – to GBAO. The volume of deliveries is now declining as a result of the improvement in agricultural production under the

agricultural reform, improvement of small business activities and energy service. Today the range of activities has expanded. The head of AKF Mr Faizov in his interview highlighted the main objective and purpose of the organization as:

AKDN is a development organization dealing with the development of the civil society. As a whole, AKDN is a group of development agencies with mandates that include the environment, health, education, architecture, culture, microfinance, rural development, disaster reduction and promotion of private-sector enterprise. Of course the activities of the organization change due to the demand of the society. The projects are renewing and are based on what is the need of time.

It is also important to highlight that the AKDN is the biggest supplier of job in the region and its agencies are almost everywhere in GBAO. Throughout its presence, the activities has expanded and strong loyalty and trust has been gained in the eyes of the government and the civil society. Moreover during an interview with the employee of the OSCE, it was noted that AKDN has a comparative advantage due to several reasons :

“AKDN is an organization that works in wide range of spheres and it is a big employer of the region. In addition it is bonded to Pamirian culture, religion and civilization which make it unique in comparison to other international organization”.

Primary the AKDN is the principal grant-making agency for social development within the Shia Ismaili Imamate. His Highness Aga-Khan IV is the chairman and founder of this network and at the same time his Highness is a religious leader of the Nizari Ismailis as it has been mentioned above in the study. The organization unites people with common objectives by bringing local knowledge, energies and resources to bear on local problems. Though, it is critical to underscore, the fact that the organizations is active not only in the areas where Ismaili believers are inhabited. In the case of Tajikistan, the network is present in GBAO and is keenly operating in Dushanbe, Gharm region and starting its activities in the north. Today, the network is present in many countries of Europe, North America, Africa, Central and

South East Asia including island like Madagascar. Besides, the network is functioning in supplementary areas where the population is not Ismaili (AKDN)

Since the establishment of the first AKDN office in Dushanbe in 1993 and launching its wide range of actions, the organization has gained a positive reputation and trust in the eyes of the government. Throughout bilateral negotiation and cooperation strong bonds and confidence have been built. As the vision of the network states

AKDN works towards the vision of an economically dynamic, politically stable, intellectually vibrant and culturally tolerant Tajikistan. This is achieved by supporting the establishment of programs and institutions that allow the Government, private sector and civil society to play complementary roles in increasing prosperity and creativity within a pluralistic society. Together these agencies collaborate towards a common goal – to build institutions and programs that can respond to the contemporary challenges and opportunities of social, economic and cultural growth in Tajikistan.

Today over 3500 people are employed by the organization in different parts of Tajikistan. In 2002 the Network and its partners founded the Pamir Energy Company under public private partnership agreement signed with the Government of Tajikistan. Likewise, AKDN and its partners launched Indigo Tajikistan in 2001 to help meet the demand for improved communication service and increased offerings in the country's mobile services industry (AKDN report). To demonstrate one of my respondent from the AKDN branch stated:

We were one of the first that were allowed to go to the region and make our small scale observation after the operation have launched. The first reason why we were the first is probably due to our wide range of activities in the region. Secondly, we had our employees that were twenty four out in contact with us and kept us up to date. Besides, our helicopter was one of the first to fly to the location of ceasefire for providing humanitarian aid.

The agency has a comparative advantage over the other institutions due to its wide network in the region. Secondly, it can be stated that the government actually trust in the institution and

it is in good relationship with the governmental structure of the country. Mary Anderson in the “Do No Harm” theory says that unintended consequences of humanitarian aid and project must be examined to identify and avoid unwanted conflict exacerbation. Basically, AKDN did the same thing by sending a special team first to examine the site and only then send humanitarian aid. From the example of Pamir clashes, one can say that the concept of “do no harm” has been employed successfully by the AKDN. Nevertheless, the question stays, why neutral IOs like the OSCE, Red Cross were not allowed by the government to fly to the region earlier and provide humanitarian aid and human right protection.

It is clear that the AKDN projects are aimed to enhance the living standard of the civilian and are involved in wide range actions. However, it has never been directly involved in the politico-military conflicts. There are different concern and reasons for conflicts to arise. A special study has been conducted by a Jan Koehler “Assessing peace and conflict in Central Asia and Northern Afghanistan”. He defined different types of conflict political, economical, and social and reasons for emergence of these conflicts. The study focus was not on a macro level or state but on micro-societal and concentrated on conflicts that arise within the communities among the youth, conflict within villages and among villages, between the young generation and the old generation, narcobarons and drug trade, human trafficking (Koehler, 2004). As the head of AKF in my interview responded:

“We have been dealing with different types of conflicts on societal base however the military conflicts are not our expertise and we do not have long term experience with dealing conflict of such scale. It was our first time directly being involved in a military conflict”.

In principal, in order to be successful in conflict resolution process, an institution is highly recommended to have an optimal Conflict-Sensitive Project Management (CSPM) plan. The aim is to ensure that the project will not have unintended consequences leading to a heightening of tensions in the field. Alterations are made to the existing projects whenever

projects flaws are identified. Thus, the adjustments become part of the project management cycle. Even though the organization did not have previous experience in military conflict management, it has developed a plan according to which it took steps. The advantage of the concept is that, it is like an ongoing improvements, in other words, if something goes wrong, adjustments can be made. On the example of the AKDN agency, one can say that despite of lack of familiarization, it was quite thriving.

Referring back to the motives of the Government toward such a large scale military operation, it has to be noted that there has to be some strong motives to take a risk and to send three thousand troops to a vulnerable strategic area. As it has been stated by one of the respondent from the AKDN:

There were many reasons for this particular operation. Firstly, GBAO is the only region where the government has not absolute regulation. The next reason of course is objective reasons more connected probably with financial resources, drug traffic, it is also connected to the question about border, with Afghanistan also there are some problems, some questions. The next reason is connected with the withdrawal of the American troops till 2014 from Afghanistan. That's why the government also worries about this situation and what happens and they would like to control the border or to identify the obstacles that can arise. It is also connected with the coming presidential that we are planning to have this year. There are a lot of reasons you know, but there are criminal aspects also, and from my point of view that maybe there are some external factors. One of the ex factors are connected with China USA, and this factors also are very important for identifying this issue,

All these concerns that have been mentioned above can be the arguments for such large scale armed operation. The aim of the study is to examine and compare the role of the international institutions like AKDN and OSCE during the conflict and therefore, it is vital initially to be informed with the grounds of the combat for further development of resolution strategy. Both organizations have been functioning in Tajikistan for a quite a long term and the range of the activities vary.

Since the signing of the peace accords, the foundation has launched an impressive array of long-term programs focusing on community-based economic development, developed a new humanities curriculum at Tajik universities, and supported development of the civil society. In addition the network is expanding its network and launching a Western-style Central Asian university with a main campus in Khorog and satellite campuses in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Initial efforts made by the AKF in the GBAO region consisted primarily of humanitarian relief; however, there was also a great need for increasing the self-sufficiency of people in the districts through increasing local food production and reforming the Soviet collective farms. In order to achieve these changes, agricultural reforms focusing on private ownership of land were promoted along with efforts to increase the amount of arable land. These activities were further complemented with the provision of technical advice, credit services and agricultural inputs to private farmers. Aga-Khan Development Networks were almost everywhere in all field, starting from civil society, education, health, agriculture and banking.

AKDN with its strong societal basis, wasn't set aside during the July combat in Khorog. Its representatives have played role of mediator along with the young activists with the Government and have played a significant role in signing agreement among the two opposing power (Asia Plus). As one of my respondent said:

AKDN had a key role during the conflict. It had the role of facilitator to guide peaceful communication between the people, local "hukumat", military leaders and local arm group. AKDN requested all these groups who were actively involved in the conflict to sit on the round table and negotiate. We created an area for both parties to come and solve the conflict peacefully.

Consequently, after negotiations the parties signed Bilateral Agreement on the 23rd of August 2012 between the representatives of Majlisi Vakiloni Khorog town, deputies of the Khorog districts, religious leaders, active societal members and Rohbaroni Sokhtorhoi kudratii RT

Vazorathoi Mudofia leaders of upper level authorities of RT –Military leader and KGB.

According to this agreement :

1. All people, that took part during the Military intervention and directly involved during the conflict are free from punishment.
2. After signing this agreement, all demonstrators that are gathered in the stadium of Ismoili Somoni in Khorog should leave the stadium
3. All the military army should leave from the inhabited areas and should we allocated to their destinations of military service.

Previous to this accord, the head of Vaziri Mudofia RT has promised to stop the military operation and withdrawal of the army from the region. However, for a month after that ceasefire the army was still in Khorog deployed in different point of the city, snipers on the mountains, and people in uniform where almost everywhere. Hence the people, civil society could not believe in the words of the government officials. The loss of trust, made the conflict unpredictable. The role of trust has been stressed by my respondent from the AKDN:

After this conflict we learned important lessons. There is no trust between the local population and the hukumat. Therefore, there is a need for building capacity of the people trust in government and government and civil society. There was a vacuum between the government and civil society. We are aiming on way how to build capacity of building trust between people and the government (highlighted several times). We worked a lot with the hukumat of ‘Federation of Village officials’ and people. Our focus was villages. We thought that the center would not have such problems because it is the center and they are enough skilled and such situations could be prevented. After even the conflict was stopped, people were not ready to listen and trust the government.

The essential role of the third party, is to control communication to create a nonthreatening atmosphere in which the participants can examine their perceptions and misperceptions about the conflict and about each other, and then jointly explore avenues for analyzing and resolving the conflict, partly through the development of common functional interests (Fisher

: 27). The agreement on the 23rd of August has been signed with the assistance of third party in the face of AKDN. As a result the parties found a number of common interests and the official document has been ratified.

In principal, conflict and tension can occur for diverse grounds such as: divergence in goals and aspirations, injustice, corruption, efforts to protect vested interests, differing beliefs, misinformation, ignorance, poor skills in resolving differences. The AKDN has been active in Tajikistan since confirming the Peace Accord to end the Civil War and has been widely dealing with most of the issues mentioned above on a daily basis. His highness Aga-Khan IV informal mediating role and moderating influence significantly contributed to the success of the peace process. The AKF made a major contribution to alleviating the humanitarian crisis, particularly in the eastern part of the country (Goryayev, 2001). Since, the end of the Civil War, the institution was not drawn into any kind of military conflict resolution process. It was mostly concentrating in enhancing the competence of the civil society through economic and social activities. The July clashes of 2012, had escorted to direct participation of the institution in the peacemaking process. It was integrated in mediation and building up mood for dialogue among the tensioned parties: between the state and local informal leaders. As well as any other conflict, the July clashes in Khorog has resulted in both human loss and loss of trust of the civil society in government. According to one of my respondents from the AKDN

After the conflict, the people have lost trust in the government. Our aim is to look for ways to rebuild the capacity of the civil society and aiming on developing trust between people and the government (highlighted several times). There is a vacuum now between the civil society and the government and we want to enhance the skills of negotiation through conducting trainings

Nevertheless, this conflict illustrated that there are areas in which AKDN should increase its involvement and well equipped of any other upcoming conflicting situation. Moreover, as the

OSCE, AKDN is planning to develop new projects for the youth. AKDN sees the main reason as unemployment, since a big number of the youth are unemployed even after gaining bachelor degree due to lack of enough employment opportunities. Besides, they are easily manipulated by the government and the commanders. Therefore, the AKDN is planning in the nearest future on initiating projects which will engage youth through trainings and other development activities.

After the settlement of the conflict to some point, it is crucial for the civil society and the government to find balance, to regain the trust and sense of stability that has been shattered for the period of the clashes. AKDN has played decisive role during the instability period and have enhanced its importance in the eyes of the civil society. Nevertheless, its main goal remains in strengthen the bridge between the civil society and government officials that have been build during signing peace accord (23 Aug Agreement). Hence, through its wide network of activities and trust in the eyes of the civil society, it is not stopping on what it has achieved so far. There are a lot of efforts need to done to erase the trauma that has left the July clashes in the conscience of many people (respondent from AKDN).

Conclusion

The core purpose of the theses was to answer two main questions that have been aimed at:

- Can the events that happened in July 2012 in the Pamir traced back to the Civil War in Tajikistan?
- Why an organization with a societal basis was dealing with the conflict and not a security organization during the July clashes?

The research analysis, proof the first hypothesis that the traumas that have beenreceived by the vulnerable minority “Pamiris” during the anarchy and disorder of the Civil War have to some extend reemerged during the July military operation. It has to be noted that the Civil

War which lasted for almost five years, took away life of more than 100 000 people. The war was not settled but stopped by the intervention of the International Organizations which assisted in signing the Peace Accord of 1997. Moreover, coming back to the July combat, it has to be highlighted that the core ground for such large scale operation despite investigation of the murder of the former SCNST general, was eliminating the former opposition leaders. According to the definition of the frozen conflict, it can be said that any internal or external factors can recur the frozen conflict and in the case of the Pamir clashes it was the death of the general. Nevertheless, the clash has been settled on signing mutual agreement on August 23rd 2012.

The central objective of the thesis was to compare and examine the role of the two international organizations the OSCE and AKDN. There is a ground for comparing particularly these two organizations, since from the first sight they are utterly different, one dealing with the societal activities and the second is present with the security mandate. Both institutions have played crucial role during the process of peace making, to end the civil war in Tajikistan. Besides, primary role for providing framework for preventive diplomacy, facilitating negotiation and conflict resolution process, is the core responsibility of OSCE and one can assume that the OSCE was believed to have visible role during the peace process. The analysis shows that, there were a number of compelling grounds for the limited role of the OSCE during the conflict. Firstly, as it has been stated by the Ambassador Ivar Vikky, until the mid-October 2012, the IOs were not granted access to GBAO by authorities. Secondly, as one of the respondent from the OSCE office cited in the interview, was lack of reliable data, absence of field office in the area and limited access. Despite the fact that the OSCE mission in Tajikistan is the biggest in CA which is comprised of main office in Dushanbe and five field offices throughout the country, it does not have any field office in GBAO. In addition, it can be stated that the institution did not use to fully the power of

political leverage to effect the settlement of the conflict. Regardless of limited direct role during the clashes, it has to be recalled that the OSCE Chairmen appealed to the government demanding freedom of speech and communication after the communication lines were cut off. Additionally, on the 13th of September 2012, OSCE office along with the Tajik Interior Ministry on SALW has organized two day operation on destruction of the weapons collected in Khorog. Moreover, after granting access for IOs, the OSCE send a team to GBAO to follow up on the implementation of the OSCE activities and discussed further projects. Besides, the OSCE is planning to develop activities and trainings for the community police and youth to regain the trust of people in the police.

On Contrary, AKDN an organization with the societal base played a key role in peace making process in the period of the clashes. The institution was directly integrated in mediation and building up mood for dialogue among the tensioned parties: between the state and local informal leaders. AKDN had comparative advantage over OSCE due to the fact that it has wide network of the activities in the region, has build strong relationship and trust with the civil society and obtained confidence through its present activities in the eyes of the government. Secondly, apart from being a development organization, it also has some religious base which corresponds to the belief of the local population.

Finally, it has to be highlighted that despite any previous expertise in military conflict resolution process, the institution took the role of mediator to bring the opposing group to come together and discuss and come to an agreement which was quite successful. This shows the competence of the institution in coping with unexpected situation, resulted in enhancement of the role of the organization as a whole in the region and the country.

To sum up, it has to be recalled that despite of unequal role of both organizations during the military operation of July 2012, both organizations have learned lessons and had some role in the conflict resolution process. Subsequently, based on the interviews conducted for the

study, it has to be recalled that both institutions have learned lessons and currently are in process of developing future plans and project to erase the trauma of the clash, reconstruct the bridge of trust between the people and the government authorities and prevent the possibility of occurring conflict in the future.

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Appendixes

1. Interview Questions for the AKDN employees

- What is the primary purpose and objectives of AKDN in Tajikistan?
- What are the main activities of the organization and how they have changed over time?(starting from launching the AKDN)
- How do you measure the activities of the organization?
- What kinds of instruments are being used in order to implement the projects?
- What do you see the reason or concerns for the conflict in Tajikistan?
- Your ideas about the conflict in Khorog? Did AKDN have any position on the conflict?
- Was the organization directly or indirectly involved in conflict prevention? How?
- What kind of approaches are being used for stabilizing and enhancing the living standard of the community?
- Was the organization prepared to such events? Does it have any future plans for stabilizing?
- How do you perceive the role of the government in conflict?

Interview Question for the OSCE employees

- What is the primary purpose and objectives of OSCE in Tajikistan?
- What are the main activities of the organization and how they have changed over time?(starting from launching OSCE)
- How do you measure the activities of the organization? What types of instruments are being used?
- What do you see the reason or concerns for the conflicts in Tajikistan?
- Is the organization directly or indirectly involved in conflict prevention? How?
- What kind of approaches it is used for stabilizing and enhancing the living standard of the community
- Was the organization prepared to such events? Does it have any future plans for stabilizing?
- What kind of approaches it is implementing for stabilizing and enhancing the living standard of the community
- Was the organization prepared to such events? Does it have any future plans for stabilizing?
- How do you monitor conflict?
- Whom do you see as the main actors?

The Conflict Prevention Centre
OSCE Secretariat, Vienna

To all OSCE Delegations in Vienna

SEC.FR/352/12
23 July 2012
RESTRICTED
ENGLISH only



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Office in Tajikistan

Spot Report

Unknown assailants kill senior state security official in Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region

On 21 July, at approximately 17:30 hours, Major General Abdullo Nazarov, aged 56, Head of the State Committee on National Security (SCNS) in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), was killed by unknown assailants outside Khorog on his return from a work trip to Ishkashim district. According to a public statement issued by the SCNS Center for Public Relations, General Nazarov's vehicle was stopped by unknown men as it approached Khorog. The statement noted that the assailants "got close to the general and inflicted several stab wounds, as a result of which he died". The SCNS Center for Public Relations attributed the killing to criminals involved in tobacco smuggling.

Media outlets have carried conflicting and unattributed reports regarding the number and condition of persons who had been traveling with General Nazarov.

The General Prosecutor of the Republic of Tajikistan noted in a press conference on 23 July that a criminal case has been launched, but that no suspects have been apprehended. The criminal investigation was opened into charges of particularly cruel murder of an individual related to professional activity, theft of weapons and use of violence against a representative of government. The head of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region has called on citizens to remain calm and to assist the efforts of the investigative commission made up of representatives of the Office of the General Prosecutor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SCNS. Today the Minister of Internal Affairs arrived in GBAO.

Media reports throughout the day have indicated an increasing presence of security forces in GBAO. In a separate press conference today, the head of the Ministry of Defense press center denied media speculation that additional military troops were being sent to Gorno-Badakhshan in the aftermath of the incident.

General Nazarov previously served as Deputy Head of the State Committee on National Security.

23 July 2012

The Conflict Prevention Centre
OSCE Secretariat, Vienna
To all OSCE Delegations in Vienna

SEC.FR/392/12
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Spot Report

Khorog: Main suspects in killing of senior state security official surrender to authorities; two persons killed as security forces open fire on vehicle

On 13 August, the state news agency *Khovar* reported about the surrender of Tolib Ayombekov to authorities in Khorog, capital of Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province (GBAO). Ayombekov, who had been named by the Office of the Prosecutor General as one of the main suspects in the 21 July killing of General Abdullo Nazarov [SEC.FR/352/12], reportedly turned himself in after making a public statement that was broadcast by a regional TV channel on 12 August. In his statement, Ayombekov demanded his trial to take place in GBAO and stressed that in his capacity as Commander of the Ishkashim Border Detachment he is not opposed to the government. Media reports that he is currently being treated at a local hospital as a result of injuries, which he claims to have suffered from a bullet.

Earlier, on 11 August, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an official statement informing that two other suspects in the murder of General Nazarov identified as the brother and the driver of Tolib Ayombekov surrendered to the authorities.

On 9 and 11 August, the *Asia-Plus* print edition and the Radio *Ozodi* website carried interviews with Imomnazar Imomnazarov and Aymobekov. Imomnazarov also had been identified by authorities as one of the leaders of illegal armed groups based in Khorog with links to a "criminal group" under the leadership of Ayombekov [SEC.FR/367/12]. In the interviews, both claimed to have laid down their weapons.

According to official information, the weapons handover process in Khorog is ongoing. About 500 weapons have been voluntarily handed over since late July. No information is readily available as to how long the handover will continue.

In other developments on 10 August, local media – referring to a statement by the Minister of Defense – informed that 200 soldiers have been withdrawn from Khorog and the surrounding areas due to the stabilizing security situation. Further details about the level of security forces and the remaining number of troops are publicly unavailable. According to reports from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the government has started negotiations with representatives of military armed groups without external mediators, the aim of which is to develop a draft agreement between parties.

Meanwhile on 10 August, media outlets reported about an incident in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province leading to the death of two persons. According to preliminary information, security forces opened fire on a taxi refusing to stop for a control by the local traffic police near Khorog. Reports suggest that a 21-year old passenger was killed on the spot and that another 25-year old passenger died later in the hospital. Two people including the driver were injured. A criminal investigation into the incident has been opened by the GBAO Regional Prosecutor's Office.

Spot Reports

The following day, local media reported on 11 August about a peaceful public gathering of 500 mostly young people in front of the Khorog city administration building expressing their concern over the incident.

During the past days, landline telephone service in GBAO has been largely restored. Mobile phone services and internet access are still limited. While access to Russian-language news sites recently reported as blocked, including *vesti.ru*, *lenta.ru* and *RIA Novosti*, has been restored, the popular news website *news.tj* as well as the video-sharing platform *YouTube* remain unavailable in Tajikistan.

According to official government statements issued earlier this month, President Emomali Rahmon is scheduled to pay a visit to GBAO at the end of August.

Access for national and international humanitarian organizations to the region remains limited, with the exception of the Aga Khan Development Network and a small number of organizations with local staff in Khorog, including the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has not yet been granted access to the region. At present, the authorities do not recommend that representatives of international organizations visit GBAO.

13 August 2012